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Consistently, policy makers have responded to threats of nuclear 
development, the rise of autocracies, mass human rights abuses, claimants over 
strategic regions, and more geopolitical issues with the use of economic sanctions. 
While governments may show an overt willingness to use sanctions as an 
effective tool of foreign policy, world leaders are still hotly debating the question 
of the efficacy of sanctions. Some have argued that sanctions will generally fail 
due to the fact that the sender country will not be able to extract any type of 
political concession from the target country. Others counter that states use 
sanctions as a symbolic signal of disapproval to a target country’s actions, not as a 
tool to reverse any type of political action. What these ideas fail to take into 
account is that there is merit to both. Governments can use sanctions merely as 
symbols of disapproval or they can use them as tools of economic coercion. Used 
to coerce a target country into making some type of political concession, 
sanctions are generally more successful against more democratic regimes versus 
more autocratic regimes. Conversely, used as symbolic tools, sanctions are 
successful at increasing the reputation of the sender country and creating 
international norms of how states ought to act. 
 
I. SANCTIONS AS TOOLS OF COERCION 
 
Before diving into what is needed for economic sanctions to be effective as tools 
of coercion, it is important to understand the definition of a successful sanction. A 
common definition is “a tool for coercing target governments into particular 
avenues of response.”  Therefore, sender states often see the failure to get that 1
particular response as a failed use of economic sanctions. Empirically, when it 
comes to bringing about political change, sanctions generally tend to fail more 
than they succeed. At their very best, when sender countries seek modest political 
change, sanctions succeed about half the time. Bigger goals, such as regime 
change, generally succeed about thirty percent of the time.  Aside from what 2
sanctions seek to achieve and their ability to do so, it is important to understand 
how economic sanctions are designed to work. At their core, the purpose of 
economic sanctions is to harm the target country's economy, causing it pain,  so 3
that the country will be forced to decide whether continuing its behavior is worth 
the ramifications of being sanctioned or if pain of economic sanctions is great 
1 ​Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, ​Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered​ (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1990), 5. 
2 ​Hufbauer et al., “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,” 158. 
3 ​Hossein G. Askari, John Forrer, Hildy Teegen, and Jiawen Yang, ​Economic Sanctions: 
Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy​ (Praeger Publishers, 2003), 191. 
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 enough to concede to the will of the sender country. For the sender state, being 
able to recognize if the target country will choose the former or latter choice is 
paramount to crafting a sound sanction policy. 
Any time a state decides to take an action against another state, whether 
that be instigating a military attack or choosing to sanction it, it is taking a 
gamble. In order for that gamble to be beneficial to a state they must have 
adequate information on the other state with whom it is interacting. Different 
regime types will have different responses due to “the institutional constraints of a 
political system [that] limit the state’s decision-making process.”  Therefore, 4
understanding how different regimes operate and how they are predisposed to 
threats and actions made against them is crucial to gauging the success of all types 
of foreign policy tools, such as economic sanctions. At face value, economic 
sanctions are a clear form of coercion, but in order for sanctions to be effective in 
extracting concessions they cannot rely solely on harming target states’ 
economies. Senders have to understand how economic burdens will translate into 
the ways target states will respond politically.  Leaders, in general, have the 
incentive to stay in power. To do so, leaders have to maintain the favor of those 
who have the capacity of granting them power: the selectorate.  In democracies, 5
where multiple parties often vie to hold power in office, people perceive the 
winning group as the winning coalition. Democratic leaders cater towards 
winning coalitions because these coalitions are the people who allowed these 
leaders to come to power in the first place. For example, President Donald Trump 
is more beholden to Republican voters that won him the presidency than 
Democratic voters that voted against him. While these coalitions might be made 
up of one or more parties, they generally reflect the political opinion of the 
majority of people within a society. In more autocratic regimes, leaders generally 
focus more on a few select powerful and wealthy elites, such as the oligarchs in 
Russia. If sanctions have the capability to wreak economic havoc within a 
country, possibly destabilizing the balance of power within it, then its leaders 
“will be concerned with how sanctions might threaten their position”  and will 6
react in a way that protects the parties that grant them power.  
Historically, democratic regimes have proven to concede more to the 
demands of economic sanctions. Democracies tend to be more predictable than 
other types of regimes due to how they are organized. Evidently, the purpose of 
4 ​Susan Hannah Allen, “Political Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions,” 
Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 3 (July 2008): 257, 
https://doi-org.lib.pepperdine.edu/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00069.x.  
 
5 ​Allen, “Political Institutions,” 123. 
6 ​Allen, “Political Institutions,” 259. 
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 any democracy is to cater to all of its constituents. Democracies and their leaders 
are characterized by having a great sense of accountability, since democracies 
contain a large numbers of people with access to political rights. Leaders in these 
types of regimes have the task of choosing between providing public goods or 
private goods. Democratic leaders generally choose to focus more on public 
goods because granting privileges to a few individuals does not have as large of 
an impact on their popularity as providing public goods, such as healthcare or 
education, to the masses. In order for leaders to “win and retain office” they must 
have “support from ‘masses.’”  Therefore, if sanctions deteriorate an economy, 7
shrinking the resources governments have to provide for public goods, 
“democracies are forced either to concede quickly” or cutback on providing 
public goods.  For example, during the Suez Crisis, the United States imposed 8
sanctions against Egypt, Britain, and France. The democratic countries, France 
and Britain, understood “that the economic power of the United States (in 
addition to the threat to hurt the strength of the pound on the international market) 
could do a good deal of damage to their economies as well as their international 
reputations,” so they yielded to the demands of the the United States.  Britain’s 9
prime minister at the time, Anthony Eden, was even forced out of office. On the 
other hand, the more autocratic regime of Egypt “made limited concessions” 
because “sanctions ‘failed to undermine Nasser’s domestic support.’”  Because 10
democracies are dependent on providing for a substantial number of people, large 
detriments to the economy will have a negative impact on the people, making it 
easier for sender states to hypothesize that democratic regimes will make political 
concessions if sanctions are placed on them. 
On the other end of the political spectrum, in autocratic regimes, it has 
proven harder to extract political concessions via the use of economic sanctions. 
As previously stated, senders rely on having adequate information about target 
countries in order to determine if imposing sanctions will be futile or not. The 
political leanings of a democracy can often be gauged by numerous measures, 
such as political pollings or past precedents on how citizens choose to vote. 
Measures like these seldom exist in autocratic regimes. Instead, the political 
leanings are of usually one person or one group, making it harder to pinpoint what 
exactly they will do in a given situation. This lack of consistent information of a 
target state’s behavior leads to senders being more likely to make demands that 
7 ​Risa A. Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type: What works and When?,” ​Security Studies ​11, no. 
4 (September 2002): 16, ​http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005349​. 
8 Allen, “Political Institutions,”123. 
9 ​Allen, “Political Institutions,” 258​. 
10 Allen, “Political Institutions,” 258​. 
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 autocratic targets will refuse  resulting in a decreased likelihood of efficacy. 11
Instead of having to cater to the masses to stay in power, autocrats usually seek to 
please the political elite, whom often have the same political ideology as them. 
These political elites are generally made up of the heads of state bureaucracies 
and the military. State bureaucracies, the “managers and chiefs of state-owned 
enterprises,”  are important because they are able to prevent a strong middle class 12
from forming that might have the potential to undermine the state. Additionally, 
the military serves to suppress any type of opposition to the regime in exchange 
for privileges and political favors.  These key groups and elites support the 13
actions of the regime and work to keep it in power.  So, as long as autocrats are 
able to satisfy the needs and wants of these people, autocrats will stay in power 
despite the imposition of sanctions. Since it is the autocratic leader that generally 
yields power over all resources within the country, this leader is able to 
manipulate the resources to the benefit of themselves and those that immediately 
support them.  They are able to do this through the promotion of “ black markets 14
under sanctions and [by] fostering a system of corruption.”  As a result, 15
economic sanctions often fail against autocratic regimes because they are unable 
to cause enough damage to the people that control the policies and actions of the 
state. In 1990, the United States placed comprehensive economic sanctions on 
Iraq after invading Kuwait. These sanctions were placed in hopes of tearing down 
Saddam Hussein but did the opposite instead. Hussein was not only able to 
survive but was able to thrive despite the fall in quality of living for the rest of 
Iraqi citizens. By “diverting shrinking public resources to his supporters in the 
government and military,” Hussein’s regime was able to continue. The designers 
of the sanctions intended for the economy to be hurt, and therefore Hussein’s 
power to be hurt, but instead it “increased his importance as a supplier of those 
resources and allowed the Iraqi regime” to continue its oppressive rule.  This was 16
also seen in the case of Rhodesia. In 1966, the United Nations sanctioned the state 
of Rhodesia to bring down white supremacist Ian Smith’s regime, but the attempt 
was futile. Smith, with the power of the government, was able to institute a “new 
winning coalition” that allowed him to maintain his rule “while all other groups 
outside the government's support base suffered disproportionately” from the 
11Allen, “Political Institutions,” 259. 
12Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type,” 17. 
13Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type,” 17. 
14 ​Allen, “Political Institutions,” 124​. 
15 ​Allen, “Political Institutions,”124. 
16 ​Durus Peksen and A. Cooper Drury, “Economic Sanctions and Political Repression: Assessing 
the Impact of Coercive Diplomacy on Political Freedoms” ​Human Rights Review ​10, no 3. 
(February 2009): 401, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12142-009-0126-2. 
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 damning effects of the sanctions and “were not even able to resist the Smith 
government's repressive measures.”  In this case, not only did sanctions prove to 17
be ineffective towards an autocratic regime, they also magnified the devastating 
conditions that oppressed groups were already facing within the country. 
Additionally, sanctions often serve as a rallying point, allowing autocrats to 
concentrate power even more. In order to squash and prevent political dissent that 
might arise from the decrease in quality of life as a result of sanctions, autocrats 
“pinpoint the imposing state(s) as a clear external threat to the nation and 
therefore a common enemy to unify the state.”  This manipulation of the 18
narrative makes it likely that political supporters of the regime will remain loyal 
to it and continue to provide for it and protect it. In countries where there is severe 
media censorship, this is particularly true. The cases of Cuba and North Korea, 
two countries with heavy media censorship, prove that the power of manipulation 
that autocrats hold allows them to cling on to their power despite decades of harsh 
sanctions.  The problem with the use of economic sanctions against autocratic 19
regimes is that the leader will always have the ability to shield themself from any 
harm that sanctions may cause. Those at the bottom of society only suffer more as 
hits to the economy lead to funds being diverted from crucial public services. 
People find it harder to stay employed, making decent wages, have access to life 
saving healthcare, and more.  As economies begin to lack the means to support all 
citizens, public services, and economic sectors, the people already facing poverty 
will only suffer more. Sanctions do more than just decrease a nation’s GDP, but 
also magnify the atrocities that poverty and political oppression already foster. 
Therefore, sanctions fail in two parts: they fail to create political concessions, and 
they fail to create better lives for the people they seek to help. 
 
II. ​SANCTIONS AS SYMBOLIC TOOLS 
 
Sender states have consistently used sanctions as a way to coerce a state to alter 
its behavior, but they have also used them to simply send a message. In most 
cases, the sender of sanctions is usually a powerful, more developed country or a 
strong international coalition, and the target is often a less developed state. For 
these powerful countries and organizations, such as the United States or United 
Nations, sanctions act as a way for them to exercise their political prowess on the 
global playing field. Especially for the United States, whom the world often sees 
17 ​Peksen and Drury, “Economic Sanctions and Political Repression,” 401. 
18 ​Alireza Naghavi and Giuseppe Pignataro, “Theocracy and Resilience Against Economic 
Sanctions,” ​Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ​111, no. 5 (March 2015): 10, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.12.018​. 
19 Naghavi and Pignataro, “Theocracy and Resilience,” 10. 
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 as the world’s “police force,” staying silent on objectionable policies of other 
states may be more harmful to its reputation than the costs of imposing sanctions.
 In the past, the United States has imposed sanctions on governments to show 20
disapproval of the violation of human rights. In 1989, the U.S. placed sanctions 
against China for the Tiananmen Square massacre.  The United Nations has 21
sanctioned ten states; Southern Rhodesia, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Sudan,  for being guilty of mass human rights abuses. Each case has had mixed 22
results on the efficacy of sanctions and whether or not they were able to stop or 
prevent further human rights abuses. One of their main objectives was to show 
that the U.N., an organization focused on geopolitical stability and preservation of 
human rights, would not stand for the violation of individuals. Overall, economic 
sanctions targeted at states that participate in human rights abuses have created a 
global norm that human rights abuses will not be tolerated, and actions will be 
taken against states that choose to engage in that behavior. Therefore, when 
questioning the validity of sanctions, the motives of the sanctions have to be 
accounted for. For sanctions that have the motive of coercing, it is easy to 
determine their success in the fact that they either create political concessions or 
they do not. For sanctions with the motive of simply sending a message about the 
sender’s political ideology, the success is not as important. Senders of these types 
of sanctions often understand that the target country may not change its action or 
behavior. Instead, the sender is more concerned with showing the world that it 
will not stand for what it sees as immorality. 
 
III. THE ROAD TO BETTER SANCTIONS 
 
There are myriad  factors that go into determining whether or not sanctions will 
be successful. Sender states have to understand their motives are to determine if 
their sanctions will even achieve what they want them to achieve. Additionally, 
sender states need to have adequate information about the target country simply to 
begin to craft an effective sanction design. The best way to determine if the 
pursuit of sanctions will be futile is to look at the regime of the sender country. 
Democratic leaders are easier to oust from power when they act in a way that 
upsets the masses, making it easier to determine how they will respond to 
sanctions. If sanctions are to hurt the masses, then democrats will most likely 
20 ​Hufbauer et al., “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,”5. 
21 ​Buhm Suk Baek, “Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations,” ​Cornell Law School 
Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers​ 11, (April 2008): 43. 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=lps_clacp. 
22Baek, “Human Rights Violations,” 27 - 41. 
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 concede to the demands of the sender to have sanctions lifted, preserving their 
power. On the other hand, autocrats can wield power how they choose and are 
only obligated to meet the wants of a few, making it harder for sender states to 
extract concessions from them. In these particular cases, sanctions generally hurt 
the populations in autocratic states more than they help because sanctions harm 
the masses and not those in power. If states continue to use economic sanctions as 
legitimate tools of foreign policy, sender states will need to work towards 
designing sanctions that will actually affect the people within autocracies that 
have the power to make decisions, rather than creating heavier economic burdens 
against the common people within these states.  
There has been an increasing trend for sender states to impose targeted or 
smart sanctions that have the purpose of only affecting the leader of a government 
and their inner circle rather than affecting the entire economy, thereby affecting 
the entire populace. Sanctions like these can cover multiple actions, such as 
freezing the assets of individuals or entities, boycotting of cultural exchanges, or 
banning diplomatic interchange, and more.  All of these are designed to have an 23
impact on the political elite that are responsible for objectionable or immoral 
actions within a country and not the citizens who often do not have a say in 
government. These targeted sanctions are hypothesized to be effective even in 
autocratic regimes due to the fact that they make it a lot harder for autocrats to 
shield themselves and supporters from the harms of sanctions. Additionally, 
because they do not affect the entire economy and the people, it is harder for 
autocrats to manipulate sanctions into a rallying point to secure more loyalty and 
support. In 2005, the Council of the European Union adopted the ​E.U Best 
Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures​ that would 
help the E.U. and its member states design and use these types of sanctions.  24
More states should follow suit in moving towards the use of smart sanctions. It is 
important to remember that sender states are typically western nations and target 
states are usually those in the global south. For western sender states to continue 
to use economic, and not targeted, sanctions for the sake of stopping human rights 
abuses is hypocritical. Human rights abuses will not be stopped by worsening the 
conditions that create human rights abuses in the first place. Sanctions are integral 
aspects of foreign policy with strong roots in history, but for these tools to remain 
legitimate and function effectively, sender states need to think more about the 
repercussions of these sanctions on the most vulnerable around the world. 
Ultimately, the ills that plague global society can only be solved by actively 
23 ​Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type,” 14-15. 
24 ​Baek, “Human Rights Violations,” 27 - 41. 
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 understanding the conditions that foster abuse and corruption and addressing the 
people that create them. 
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